THE ISAF COALITION: ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AGHANISTAN?
The United States alliance system has been a cornerstone of peace and security… contributing significantly to achieving all U.S. objectives.
-Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense
The International Operating Environment
In 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the international environment and ushered in an era of persistent conflict where the United States struggles against the threat of extremism, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons and the rise of military power of other states. 2 The profuse nature of these threats and the international responsibilities of the United States dictate that in order to achieve its "ends," the United States should fight within the context of alliances and coalitions to provide effective "ways" and sufficient "means." prevent its capacity to threaten America and its allies in the future. 4 To accomplish these aims, the United States has pledged to work with allies and partners to reverse the momentum of the Taliban and their ability to overthrow the government of Afghanistan and deny Al Qaeda safe-havens. 5 This suggests that the best way to achieve these goals is the continued use of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition. However, because of the challenges of multilateralism, many in the United
States question whether or not the broad coalition is the optimum, or even appropriate, way to proceed. Applying three core counterinsurgency criteria, this paper evaluates the cost / benefit of current efforts to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan. It also evaluates the options of acting unilaterally or through a more limited coalition. Finally, it presents conclusions and recommendations that may be instructive as to whether large coalitions are a suitable, feasible, and acceptable way to achieve the broader global interests of the United States.
Insurgency U.S. Joint doctrine defines insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. 6 Insurgent groups exploit geographic, political or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity in order to undermine government capacity to provide stability and security. 7 The focus of an insurgency is to gain and maintain legitimacy and influence over the population through political, psychological, informational, military and economic methods with the aim of forcing political change. 8 While the government normally has the advantage in resources, this edge is counterbalanced by the requirements to maintain order and protect the population. 9 "Insurgents succeed by introducing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere." Third, given the number of participants in COIN, the results of decision-making are often pre-approved and inflexible policies that generally provide unity effort but do not allow counterinsurgent forces the ability to react to dynamic changes in the environment. 26 Executing a flexible strategy is therefore complicated and places strain on unity of effort. As circumstances change, disunity among counterinsurgent efforts results in de-synchronization. Failure to achieve unity of effort produces wellintentioned but uncoordinated actions that can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. These restrictions include prohibiting forces from conducting combat operations, preventing their moving outside of Forward Operating Bases, or requiring their forces operate in certain areas. Caveats present significant challenges to U.S. and coalition commanders who find themselves obliged to influence, rather than command, the forces in their charge. Caveats add considerable complexity to achieving unity of command and limit the "means" provided to the force commander. 43 In contrast, non-U.S. PRTs are often ill-funded, tend to lack purpose and direction and are often ineffective. 44 Given their wide-ranging capacities/performance and each nation's cultural proclivities, PRTs present significant challenges to U.S. and coalition commanders working to achieve civil-military unity of effort.
Does ISAF Enhance or Hinder U.S. Efforts?
Fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan as a broad coalition provides significant legitimacy. The number of nations and variety of cultures involved can be viewed, internationally, as sufficient to oversee an honest political process to create a legitimate government. Sponsorship by NATO supports legitimacy because, among other things, its consensus requirement for decision-making provides a strong organizational structure for debating and reaching decisions on ISAF policies. 45 While cumbersome, this works to enhance the quality of the decision and increases the acceptability and legitimacy of the ISAF mission among the populations of the Alliance and throughout the world. 46 Additionally, the consensus provision places organizational constraints on the immediate use of force. As an example, civilian casualties, as noted by GEN
McChrystal, have severely damaged ISAF's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. 47 Within Central Asia, the representation of 43 nations in the coalition acts as a considerable and legitimate voice and significant lever in shaping the Afghan government. The comprehensive nature of ISAF also enhances the ability to influence the governments of Pakistan, Iran and others in the region important to U.S. and allied desire for regional stabilization. Internal to Afghanistan, the ability to create an honest and legitimate political process that includes the periodic transfer of authority, as outlined in FM 3-24, will likely be considered just and fair by the Afghan people. ISAF contributes to the acceptance of a legitimate government by helping the Afghan government, through PRTs, provide services, and economic and social development.
The deliberate decision-making process improves the chances of the appropriate use of force and helps ISAF avoid perceived brutality that undermined French efforts in Algeria.
Within the U.S., the broad ISAF coalition is seen by the American people as legitimate, and therefore acceptable. Multilateral authorization for the use of force confers a degree of legitimacy required by the American public. 48 Burden-sharing has always been a central issue in NATO and often a point of friction. Burden-sharing can be defined as, "the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal."
This positively affects the national will needed to sustain a long counterinsurgency campaign. Similarly, sponsorship by NATO provides governments within the Alliance the domestic political leverage to sell ISAF participation to their home constituencies. 49 The broad ISAF coalition has the potential to provide a significant amount of manpower, intelligence, and other resources necessary to sustain the conflict over time and to build a legitimate government in Afghanistan. ISAF not only provides resources to accomplish the mission, it reduces the cost load on the United States. Significantly, about half of the over 84,000 troops and the majority of the PRTs in ISAF come from nations other than the U.S. 50 Despite these advantages, the broad coalition causes significant risks. As noted, unity of effort is one of the most important tenets of fighting an insurgency.
Fundamentally, despite their agreement on the desire to stabilize the country to prevent Importantly, this includes resources and support to training and building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) allowing the Afghan government to provide security for the populace. This is fundamental for the government to be viewed as legitimate by the population. So, without the resources provided by the other 42 nations in Afghanistan, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to muster sufficient resources to achieve success.
the return of a terrorist state ("ends"),not all ISAF or NATO participants share the priorities, "ways," and/or "means" of the U.S. 51 For example, some allied governments believe that poor governance, rather than an insurgency, is the principal problem impeding stabilization of the country. 52 There have also been significant differences over how to deal with the Afghan narcotics industry known to finance the insurgency. 53 In order to obtain consensus from 28 NATO nations to conduct an operation or modify policy, the U.S. consistently expends significant political capital and time and often is forced to cooperate to the lowest-common-denominator. 54 The consequences of lengthy discussions and compromise include inflexible policies that do not allow COIN forces to respond dynamically to the changing operating environment. It also results in diluted mandates to operational commanders who then have to deal with national caveats and forces who also report to their national command authorities.
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Finally, the diversity of ISAF makes it culturally complex and difficult to achieve unity of effort. Differences in national doctrines, languages, and cultures often cause ruptures in understanding and the ability to effectively communicate.
This may lead to a longer conflict with greater cost. 56 Should the U.S. Act Unilaterally?
But there are great advantages to this cultural diversity, like the ability to gain a better understanding of the core sources of the insurgency and greater facility to innovate and problem solve.
In sum, ISAF may not be the optimal way to provide the unity of effort necessary for success in Afghanistan.
A senior U.S. military commander observed in early 2009 that unity of effort is the most serious problem facing Afghanistan. He noted that, "It's not security. It's the utter failure in the unity of effort department." 57 Getting multiple international organizations, nations and agencies pulling in the same direction is a monumental challenge. 58 Organizational studies have shown that homogeneous groups often outperform diverse groups. 59 However, fighting unilaterally would introduce significant risk, in terms of acceptability and feasibility, to achieving the objectives of the United States in Afghanistan. Without the legitimacy that the ISAF coalition provides, the U.S. would find itself isolated from, and criticized by, the rest of the world. It would also be hard pressed to showcase the Afghan government as legitimate, both to internal and external audiences. Fighting unilaterally would deny the United States the cultural diversity of input at all levels of the operation. Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency and being seen as legitimate.
Since unity of effort is critical in a counterinsurgency, fighting unilaterally might be a better course of action for the United States. The U.S. has recent success in developing counterinsurgency doctrine and has promoted senior leaders who embrace it. The President has approved a population-centric counterinsurgency in Afghanistan that will allow the execution of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Moreover, NATO does not have an agreed upon COIN doctrine. Acting unilaterally, the U.S. could implement its COIN doctrine with greater unity of effort, purpose and will. A unilateral force has lessened interoperability challenges, due to compatible equipment and culture, and can share information generally without constraints. A unilateral force has greater tactical and operational flexibility because it is not hindered by the monumental complexity broad coalitions introduce. 60 Without the coalition, U.S. Without the ability to share the burden, the U.S. would likely find itself unable to achieve success.
Another option might be to rely on a coalition of the willing. This could provide some of the advantages of a broader coalition (including legitimacy and burdensharing), while potentially improving the ability to fight and work together efficiently. The
United States would achieve greater unity of effort by forming a small coalition of trusted states that share common views of "ends," "ways" and "means. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
The ISAF coalition in Afghanistan, while having its drawbacks, is the best way to achieve the objectives of the United States in Afghanistan and provides the best approach for the United States to achieve broader national interests. NATO policy and decision-making is often frustrating and lethargic. As discussed, the command and control establishment within ISAF is fractured and complex. But despite these shortcomings, fighting as a broad coalition generates legitimacy and contributes resources and the promise of sufficient resources to sustain a long counterinsurgency campaign. That said, improvements in all three critical counterinsurgency areas are required.
First, for the government to be viewed as legitimate outside of Kabul, all levels of government -national, provincial, district and village -must be perceived by the people as free from corruption and able to meet the basic needs of the people. Part and parcel to an honest political process at the national level is an honest political process at the provincial and district level. Routinely electing provincial governors and councils, and district chiefs and councils will strengthen legitimacy. 63 In tandem is the issue of properly resourcing Afghan government institutions below the national level. Provincial and district level governments lack capacity, authority and a functional judicial systems while most of the villages lack any meaningful government presence. 64 In order to improve legitimacy, ISAF must reinforce and standardize the capacity of its PRTs and work with the United Nations and others to provide essential services where none exist.
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NATO resourcing must also improve. Although the presence of 43 nations in the ISAF coalition helps, the effort continues to be under resourced. For six years, the United States' focus on Iraq has had a direct and correspondingly negative effect on priorities and resources for Afghanistan. Because it is the biggest contributor to ISAF, this neglect was imitated by the rest of the coalition resulting in years of under resourcing. 66 The shift in U.S. national priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, together with the decision by President Obama to deploy additional forces to ISAF, are positive steps and should set the example for the other ISAF troop contributing nations to improve support.
Next, a drastic improvement in civilian capacity and capability must take place to not only improve civil-military unity of effort but to add additional resources for the successful conduct of counterinsurgency and the training of the ANSF. 67 The relative level of civilian resources must be balanced with security forces so that gains in security do not outpace civilian capacity for governance and economic improvements. 68 Finally, and most significantly, unity of effort in ISAF has to improve, beginning with the mission. Now is the time to finally eliminate the mission tension between OEF's focus on counterterrorism and NATO ISAF's counterinsurgency approach. The new U.S. strategy favoring counterinsurgency over counterterrorism provides an opportunity to improve unity of effort with NATO.
Increasing both military and civilian resources together have effects greater than the sum of the parts and will result in an enhanced ability to achieve the strategy of "shape, Third, in conjunction with a unified mission, organizational structures must be optimized to achieve unity of effort. As noted by GEN McChrystal in his initial assessment, "[u]nder the existing structure, some [military] components are not effectively organized and multiple headquarters fail to achieve either unity of command or unity of effort." 73 The recent decision to add a 3-star level command to oversee the day-to-day operational issues and to ensure that all U.S. and coalition forces are synchronized so that the 4-star command can focus on strategy and synchronization of civil-military operations at the strategic level is a positive step. 74 Finally, mission and organizational unification must include improved civil-military collaboration. The entire ISAF chain of command must expand and coalesce to deal with the rapid need in counterinsurgency to adjust strategy and react to dynamic and evolving circumstances. 75 Not since World War Two has the U.S. had the opportunity to directly influence so many nations. Strong, visionary U.S. leadership of the NATO ISAF coalition can produce relationships and methodologies that transcend the Afghan war. These relationships can be used by the U.S. to further national interests around the world. In the end, using the broad ISAF coalition in Afghanistan is a political reality. It remains to be seen whether or not NATO's participation will lead to success in Afghanistan and whether that translates into continued relevance and survival of NATO. The question for U.S. strategists is whether or not the broad coalition is worth the effort. Ultimately, ISAF is an experiment whose success or failure will inform the future use of broad coalition warfare to achieve U.S. objectives and interests.
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